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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Michael D. Pulsifer appeals from the judgment of conviction for possession of 
methamphetamine entered upon his guilty plea, arguing that the district court abused its 
discretion by not sua sponte ordering a competency evaluation before taking his plea. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
A patrol officer watched as Pulsifer, driving a Ford Bronco, parked in front of an 
apartment complex. (R., pp.9-10.) A man approached the passenger side of the car 
from the apartments, stood next to the window for about 20 seconds, and then returned 
to the apartments. (R., p.10.) The officer ran the license plates for the Bronco and they 
returned for a Mitsubishi Gallant. (ld.) The officer pulled over the Bronco and, during 
the course of his brief detention, asked Pulsifer and his passenger if there was anything 
inside the vehicle that he should know about before he deployed his canine. (Id.) The 
passenger immediately pointed out a pipe and told the officer that Pulsifer had also 
hidden a box as they were being pulled over. (ld.) The officer located the box, which 
contained a clear glass pipe, a beaker, and a plastic baggie of crystal 
methamphetamine. (Id.) Continuing his search, the officer also found loaded syringes, 
a small digital scale, packaging materials, several cotton swabs, a small torch, and 
other instruments associated with the drug trade. (R., p.11.) 
The state charged Pulsifer with possession of methamphetamine with the intent 
to deliver. (R., pp.49-50.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, the state reduced the charge 
to simple possession of methamphetamine and Pulsifer pled guilty. (Tr., p.8, Ls.11-14; 
R., pp.58, 74-75.) After a probing plea colloquy, the district court accepted Pulsifer's 
1 
guilty plea and ordered a presentence report with a substance abuse evaluation. (Tr., 
p.9, L.13-p.10, L.2; R, pp.70-71.) 
During a pre-sentencing hearing, defense counsel conveyed concerns to the 
district court from Pulsifer's friends and family members regarding head injuries he had 
suffered in a prior car accident and requested a mental health evaluation. (Tr., p.12, 
L.21 - p.13, L.13.) The district court ordered the mental health evaluation. (R, p.124.) 
The case proceeded to sentencing where the district court entered judgment against 
Pulsifer and imposed a unified sentence of seven years with three years fixed. (R, 
pp.141-44.) Pulsifer filed a timely notice of appeal. (R, pp.151-53.) 
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ISSUES 
Pulsifer states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the failure to order a psychiatric evaluation and conduct a 
hearing to determine Mr. Pulsifer's competence to plead guilty and be 
sentenced violate the state and federal constitutional rights to due process 
as well as I.C. §§ 18-210 - 18-212? U.S. Const. Amends. 5 and 14; Idaho 
Const. Art. I, § 13. 
(Appellant's brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Pulsifer failed to establish that the district court committed fundamental error 
by not sua sponte ordering an evaluation of Pulsifer's competency to plead guilty? 
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ARGUMENT 
Pulsifer Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Committed Fundamental Error, 
By Not Sua Sponte Ordering An Evaluation To Determine His Competency To Plead 
Guilty 
A. Introduction 
Pulsifer argues that the district court erred by not sua sponte ordering a 
psychiatric evaluation to determine his competency to plead guilty. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.5-9.) He contends that there was evidence before the district court which should 
have raised a genuine doubt about his competency and, as such, the failure to order an 
evaluation violated his due process rights and I.C. §§ 18-210 and 18-211. (ld.) This 
argument fails. Pulsifer did not request a competency evaluation and, contrary to his 
assertions, the record is devoid of any evidence that would have raised a bona fide 
doubt about his mental capacity either to understand the proceedings against him or to 
assist in his own defense, such that the district court would have been required to order 
a competency evaluation on its own motion. Pulsifer has failed to establish fundamental 
error or a violation of his due process rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an 
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 
245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). "The decision whether reasonable grounds exist to order a 
psychiatric evaluation and to conduct a hearing to determine a defendant's competence 
to stand trial1 is left to the trial court's discretion." State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 777, 
1 The competency standard for pleading guilty is the same as the competency standard 
for proceeding to trial. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 391 (1993). 
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229 P.3d 379, 382 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 822, 992 
P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Potter, 109 Idaho 967, 969, 712 P.2d 668, 
670 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
C. There Was Insufficient Evidence Before The Trial Court To Raise A Bona Fide 
Doubt About Pulsifer's Competency To Stand Trial 
To establish fundamental error, Pulsifer is required to show on the record a clear 
violation of an unwaived constitutional right which prejudiced him. Perry, 150 Idaho at 
228, 245 P.3d at 980. Pulsifer argues that his unwaived constitutional right to due 
process was violated by the district court's not sua sponte ordering a competency 
evaluation. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-9.) Pulsifer has failed to show any violation of his 
due process rights and has therefore failed to establish fundamental error. 
Due process prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not mentally 
competent to stand trial. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 169-70 (2008); Drope v. 
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966); 
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 62, 90 P.3d 278, 287 (2003). To safeguard this right, 
Idaho statutory law requires a trial court to order a psychological evaluation when there 
is a genuine reason to doubt the defendant's competence to assist in his own defense 
or understand the proceedings. I. C. §§ 18-210 and 18-211. 
A defendant's fitness to proceed to trial is determined by the trial judge, who has 
a "continuing duty to observe a defendant's ability to understand the proceedings 
against him." State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 822, 992 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Ct. App. 
1999) (citing State v. Potter, 109 Idaho 967,969,712 P.2d 668,670 (Ct. App. 1985)); 
see also I.C. § 18-212. However, "[a] trial court has no duty to independently inquire as 
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to the competency of a defendant unless the defendant raises the issue by motion or by 
presenting evidence showing lack of competency." State v. Hayes, 138 Idaho 761,764, 
69 P.3d 181,184 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. Fuchs, 100 Idaho 341,346,597 P.2d 
227, 232 (1979)). When the issue of competency has not been explicitly raised, the trial 
court must sua sponte inquire as to the defendant's competency only if the evidence 
before it raises a bona fide doubt as to the competence of the defendant. Pate, 383 
U.S. at 385; Fuchs, 100 Idaho at 346-47,597 P.2d at 232-33; Hayes, 138 Idaho at 764, 
69 P.3d at 184. 
The test for determining a defendant's competence to stand trial is whether he 
"has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding and whether he has a rational, as well as factual, understanding 
of the proceedings against him." Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 62, 90 P.3d at 287 (citing 
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); accord I.C. § 18-210 (prohibiting the 
prosecution of any "person who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to 
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense"). Thus, to 
establish a due process violation, a defendant claiming for the first time on appeal that 
the trial court erred by not ordering a competency evaluation must show from the record 
as a whole that there was "substantial evidence sufficient to raise a genuine doubt" 
concerning the defendant's ability to assist in his own defense and understand the 
nature of the proceedings. See Bassett v. McCarthy, 549 F.2d 616, 619 (9th Cir. 1977). 
Therefore, to establish fundamental error in this case, Pulsifer is required to show that 
there was substantial evidence on the record sufficient to raise a genuine doubt 
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concerning his ability to assist his defense counsel and understand the nature of the 
proceedings against him. Pulsifer has failed to carry this burden. 
The United States Supreme Court has said, "[t]here are ... no fixed or immutable 
signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to 
proceed .... " Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. "[E]vidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, 
his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all 
relevant in determining whether further inquiry is required." kl Other relevant factors 
include trial counsel's perceptions of the defendant's competence, the defendant's 
communications with the district court, and the defendant's ability to use legal terms 
appropriately. See Hayes, 138 Idaho at 764-65, 69 P.3d at 184-85; United States v. 
Landers, 564 F.3d 1217, 1221 (10th Cir. 2009); Williams V. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 
606 (9th Cir. 2004); United States V. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1233 (2nd Cir. 2002); 
United States V. Lewis, 991 F.2d 524, 528 (9th Cir. 1993). 
Examining the record as a whole, there is no indication that Pulsifer was unable 
to assist his defense counselor understand the nature of the proceedings against him. 
The state notes that Pulsifer apparently answered "yes" initially to question 12 on his 
Guilty Plea Advisory Form,2 which asks, "Do you claim that you are mentally incapable 
of understanding these proceedings or what it means to plead guilty to a crime?" (R., 
p.60.) The district court, recognizing the potential issue this presented, specifically 
addressed that answer with Pulsifer as follows: 
2 It appears from the face of the form that Pulsifer also answered "No" to question 12, 
though that may have occurred as a consequence of his subsequent discussion with the 
district court. (See R., p.60; compare with Tr., p.7, Ls.10-19.) 
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THE COURT: Question 12 says, "Do you claim that you are 
mentally incapable of understanding these proceedings or what it means 
to plead guilty to a crime?" You circled the answer yes. Is that correct? 
THE DEFENDANT: That's not correct. 
THE COURT: Should the answer be no? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You understand what we're doing here today, don't 
you? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
(Tr., p.7, Ls.10-19.) Pulsifer unambiguously asserted that he understood the nature of 
the proceedings against him; the district court did not commit fundamental error by 
accepting Pulsifer's unambiguous assertion that he understood the proceedings. 
Likewise, the record is replete with examples of Pulsifer participating in the 
proceedings and assisting his defense counsel. Pulsifer participated in the plea 
negotiations and understood his agreement with the state. (R., pp.58, 66-67; Tr., pA, 
L.17 - p.5, L.3.) Pulsifer discussed his post plea rights with his attorney. (R., p.68.) 
Pulsifer actively participated in the plea colloquy, directly and coherently answering all 
of the court's questions. (See Tr., ppA-10.) Pulsifer's defense counsel, who was in the 
best position to evaluate Pulsifer's ability to understand the proceedings and assist in 
his own defense, never expressed any concerns regarding Pulsifer's competence to 
plead guilty; rather, defense counsel noted that Pulsifer's plea was made with counsel's 
advice and consent. (Tr., p.9, Ls.13-17.) Pulsifer was able to go over the presentence 
investigation report with his attorney and asserted several corrections to that report 
which were subsequently presented to the district court during sentencing. (Tr., p.21, 
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LA - p.26, LA.) Pulsifer spoke at length with his attorney about the recommendations 
counsel would present at the sentencing hearing. (Tr., p.29, L.22 - p.30, L.10.) Pulsifer 
also addressed the district court directly and coherently at sentencing. (Tr., p.31, L.7 -
p.34, L.13.) The record shows no substantial evidence sufficient to raise a genuine 
doubt concerning Pulsifer's ability to both understand the nature of the proceedings 
against him and assist in his own defense. 
Notwithstanding the clear evidence from the record demonstrating Pulsifer's 
competence, he argues on appeal that other evidence, such as concerns from family 
and friends regarding a head injury, his counsel's request for a mental health 
evaluation, statements from the mental health evaluator, Pulsifer's missing an 
appointment with his attorney, his improperly filling-out the answer sheet for his GAIN 
assessment, and his statements at the sentencing hearing, all suggested competency 
issues and so the district court should have sua sponte ordered a competency 
evaluation. (Appellant's brief, p.B.) Pulsifer'S claims do not withstand scrutiny. 
During a pre-sentencing hearing held more than two months after Pulsifer 
entered his guilty plea, defense counsel conveyed to the district court concerns from 
Pulsifer's friends and family regarding head injuries Pulsifer had suffered in a car 
accident and requested a mental health evaluation to "determine the extent of any 
impairment that may have happened and whether he is in need of any current mental 
health treatment." (Tr., p.12, L.21 - p.13, L.13.) The district court ordered the mental 
health evaluation. (R., p.124.) The mental health evaluator obseNed that Pulsifer did 
not have any functional deficits due to mental health, that his thought processes "were 
logical with light associations," and that "[h]e was oriented to person, place, time and 
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purpose." (Idaho Standard Mental Health Assessment, pp.3-8 (appended to PSI).) The 
evaluator found that Pulsifer did not need any mental health treatment, but that he had 
issues with substance dependency. (Id., p.9) While the mental health evaluator stated 
that Pulsifer "does not appear to understand the terms of his plea agreement" (id.), 
there was no indication that this was due to a lack of competence as opposed to a 
miscommunication with counselor post-hoc attempts to get out of his plea. This 
evidence does not raise a genuine doubt concerning Pulsifer's ability to both understand 
the nature of the proceedings against him and assist in his own defense. 
The rest of Pulsifer's claims arise from the sentencing hearing. Pulsifer failed to 
go over the presentencing report prior to the hearing. (Tr., p.17, L.10 - p.18, L.2.) 
Apparently frustrated by the defense's lack of preparation, the district court still 
postponed sentencing so Pulsifer could go over the report with his counsel. (Tr., p.19, 
Ls.12-20.) When Pulsifer was given the opportunity to address the court, he explained 
that he missed the final appointment with his attorney, where they planned to review the 
presentence report, due to a scheduling miscommunication. (Tr., p.31, L.25 - p.32, 
L.16.) Nothing in that exchange creates a bona fide doubt as to Pulsifer's competence. 
Second, in an effort to explain away "issues on the GAIN Assessment," defense counsel 
noted that Pulsifer thought he might have "filled in the wrong dots" and so provided 
inaccurate answers. (Tr., p.24, Ls.11-16.) Nothing in the record explains what those 
inaccuracies were, nor did defense counselor Pulsifer ever equate his possibly filling-in 
the wrong dots with a potential competency issue. Finally, as noted above, just as he 
had coherently addressed the court during his plea colloquy, Pulsifer coherently 
addressed the court during his sentencing colloquy. (See Tr., p.31, L.8 - p.34, L.13.) 
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Nothing in the record creates a genuine doubt as to Pulsifer's ability to 
understand the nature of the proceedings against him or assist in his own defense. 
Pulsifer has therefore failed to establish fundamental error in the district court's not sua 
sponte ordering a competency evaluation. The judgment of the district court should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Pulsifer's conviction and 
sentence for possession of methamphetamine. 
DATED this 29th day of June, 2012. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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